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The Populist Backlash Against Europe: Why Only Alternative Economic 
and Social Policies Can Stop the Rise of Populism in Europe 
 
Bojan Bugarič1 
I. Introduction  
 
 
The European Union is facing an unprecedented political crisis. This club of liberal and 
democratic countries has been confronted by a nationalist and populist backlash that threatens 
the core principles at the very heart of the EU.2 Capitalizing on the European sovereign debt 
crisis, the backlash against refugees streaming in from the Middle East, public angst over the 
growing terror threat, and Brexit, previously fringe populist political parties are growing with 
alarming speed. Populists not only attack policies that are based on core institutional pillars of 
the European integration project, but quite often they also challenge the very foundations of the 
project as such.  
 
Populism is an ideology or political movement that “considers society to be ultimately 
separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, the pure people versus the corrupt 
elite, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonte generale of the 
people.”3 Populism seeks to speak in the name of the common people. Its distinctive features 
are the prioritization of popular sovereignty, direct democracy and a strong emphasis on anti- 
elitism. Beyond these shared common features, populism emerges in a variety of forms. While 
populism is hostile to elites, it is also vague and moralistic and as such quite easily 
instrumentalized by almost any type of ideology, both left and right. Hence, there exist several 
rather different varieties of populism: agrarian, socio-economic, xenophobic, reactionary, 
authoritarian, and progressive populism.4 
 
Part of the blame for the populist upsurge falls on both center-right and center-left party 
leaders who have failed to respond effectively to the European debt crisis. This fact is often 
obscured by the current focus on the migrant crisis as the single most important contributor to 
the populist surge. As Vivien Schmidt correctly argues, it is “neo-liberalism gone too far”5 that 
is the major contributor to the anger fueling the rise of populism in Europe. There are also other 
rival theories attempting to explain the current rise of populism, which point to a variety of 
structural factors, ranging from the effects of globalization and global trade on income 
                                                 
1 For their comments and suggetions, I would like to thank Francesca Bign mi, Fernanda Nicola, Peter Lindseth, 
Philomila Tsoukala, and other participants of the the workshop.  
2 Desmond Dinan, Neil Nugent, and William Paterson, eds., The European Unio  in Crisis (London: Palgrave, 
2017); James Kirchick, The End of Europe: Dictators, Demagogues, and the Coming Dark Age (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2017). 
3 Cass Mudde, “The Populist Zeitgeist,” Government and Opposition 39, no. 4 (2004): 543. 
4 Margaret Canovan, Populism (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1981); Noam Gidron and Bart  
Bonikowski, “Varieties of Populism: Literature Review and Research Agenda,” Working Paper Series, No.13-
0004, Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 2013, 
https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/gidron_bonikowski_populismlitreview_2013.pdf; Cass Mudde and Cristóbal 
Rovira Kaltwasser, “Populism,” in The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies, eds. Michael Freeden and 
Marc Stears (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 495-98. 
5 Vivien Schmidt, “Missing Topic In #EUref: Neo-Liberalism Gone Too Far,” Social Europe, June 22, 2016, 
https://www.socialeurope.eu/missing-topic-euref-neo-liberalism-gone-far; see also Jurgen Habermas, “New” 
Perspectives for Europe, Social Europe, 22.10.2018, https://www.socialeurope.eu/new-perspectives-for-europe. 
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distribution,6 to a decline in the subjective social status of white men,7 and, last but not least, to 
culture—where populism is a reaction against progressive cultural change.8  
 
Although the roots of populism are complex, austerity and neoliberal structural reforms 
are undoubtedly one of the most important underlying factors. The ruling parties’ obsession 
with fiscal austerity, and with supply-side policies of privatization, deregulation, and 
liberalization, effectively triggered a “lost decade” of economic stagnation, rising 
unemployment, increasing poverty, and dwindling EU solidarity that paved the way for the 
poisonous ultra-nationalism now on the rise.9 All this has driven trust in the EU to an all-time 
low and fueled pathologies not seen since the 1930s, placing the European integration project 
on truly precarious ground. The new populist “Zeitgeist” is best described by Jan Zielonka, who 
argues that “under attack is not just the EU but also other symbols of the current order: liberal 
democracy and neo-liberal economics, migration and a multicultural society, historical ‘truths’ 
and political correctness, moderate political parties and mainstream media, cultural tolerance 
and religious neutrality.”10 Moreover, while populism comes in many versions, what almost all 
populists in Europe share is the rejection of “people and institutions that have governed Europe 
in the last three decades.”11 
 
In many countries, populist parties are the only ones to argue that there exists a real 
alternative. They protest against the “consensus at the centre”—between the centre-right and 
centre-left—around the idea that there is no alternative to neo-liberal globalization. In the eyes 
of populists, the European project is the embodiment of a ruthless process of globalization 
responsible for intolerable levels of inequality, declining trust in democracy,  rising danger of 
terrorism, and increasing fear of loss of one’s “national” and “cultural” identity. Many major 
populist parties in Western Europe today are both anti-Eurozone and anti-European. On the left, 
only populists in Greece and Spain support both the euro and the European project. On the right, 
only two major populist parties (Germany’s right-wing AfD and Italy’s Five Star Movement) 
are not outright anti-European, but they are both against the euro.12 The populists in the East 
have gone even farther in their confrontation with the EU. They frontally assault core EU 
values, contest the legitimacy of EU institutions and policies, and, at home, dismantle 
constitutional democracy.   
 
                                                 
6 Dani Rodrik, “Populism and the Economics of Globalization,” Journal of International Business Policy (2018), 
https://drodrik.scholar.harvard.edu/files/dani-rodrik/files/populism_and_the_economics_of_globalization.pdf 
7 Noam Gidron and Peter A. Hall, “The Politics of Social Status: Economic and Cultural Roots of the Populist 
Right,” British Journal of Sociology 68, no. 1 (2017): 57-84.  
8 Ronald F. Inglehart and Pippa Norris, “Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and 
Cultural Backlash,” Faculty Research Working Paper Series, Harvard Kennedy School, August 2016, 
https://www.hks.harvard.edu/publications/trump-brexit-and-rise-populism-economic-have-nots-and-cultural-
backlash.  
9  Barry Eichengreen, The Populist Temptation: Economic Grievance and Political Reaction in the Modern Era 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 163.; Jason Beckfield, “European Integration and Income 
Inequality,” American Sociological Review 71 (December 2006): 964–85; Jason Beckfield, Unequal Europe: 
How Regional Integration Reshaped the Welfare State and Reversed the Egalitarian Turn (Oxford University 
Press, forthcoming). 
10 Jan Zielonka, Counter-Revolution: Liberal Europe in Retreat (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 2.
11 Zielonka, Counter-Revolution, 3. 
12 Jeremy Ashkenas and Gregor Aisch, “European Populism in the Age of Donald Trump,” The New York Times, 




The populist backlash in essence represents a delayed Polanyian response to the 
destructive forces of the unfettered logic of free markets.13 As Karl Polanyi demonstrated in his 
Great Transformation,14 when markets become “dis-embedded” from their societies and create 
severe social dislocations, people eventually revolt. Despite important differences between the 
new populist forces in Europe, they have “more in common than we think. They are all pro-
welfare (for some people, at least), anti-globalization, and most interestingly, pro-state, and 
although they say it sotto voce on the right, anti-finance.”15 As Chantal Mouffe argues, 
populists are not against the European project as such, but only against “the neo-
liberal incarnation of the European project.”16  
 
Vindication of “the social”17 by the populist forces does not mean only a defense of social 
rights but also a demand for greater autonomy of Member States on cultural (identity) and  
economic issues.18 The populists do not seek to completely dismantle the EU. They do, 
however, demand that their national sovereignty be “restored” and oppose any further attempts 
toward an “ever closer union.”  Much like in the 1930s, the protagonists of “the social” appear 
in different political forms, ranging from the extreme right to the extreme left on the political 
spectrum. While populist forces often pose legitimate political questions about the current state 
of democracy in Europe, their solutions tend to be controversial.19 Their visions of 
emancipating “the social” often bear an uncanny resemblance to illiberal and authoritarian 
ideals from the 1930s.   
 
How did Europe get from the postwar ideal embodied in the Treaty of Rome that appeared 
to dislodge authoritarian nationalism to the situation where Member States feel threatened by 
the European project? Part II  offers a brief overview of populism in the East, in particular the 
two most notorious cases of populist backlash, Poland and Hungary.   
 
In Parts III  and IV, I briefly examine how the EU deals with current populist backlash 
in cases where populists directly attack or undermine the authority of EU Law. In Part V, I 
argue that what is needed is a different approach. Instead of focusing only on legal or economic 
sanctions, the EU should look to alternative economic and social policies that would speak 
directly to the anxieties of populist voters.20 The good news is that this trend can be reversed—
but only if European leaders, together with the Member States, articulate a coherent alternative 
                                                 
13 Robert Kuttner, Can Democracy Survive Global Capitalism? (New York: W.W Norton & Company, 2018), 
xx-xxii. 
14 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of our Time, 2nd ed. (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 2001). 
15 Mark Blyth, “Global Trumpism: Why Trump's Victory was 30 Years in the Making and Why It Won't Stop 
Here,” Foreign Affairs, November 15, 2016, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2016-1 15/global-
trumpism.  
16 Chantal Mouffe, “In Defence of Left-Wing Populism,” The Conversation, April 29, 2016, 
http://theconversation.com/in-defence-of-left-wing-populism-55869; see also Chantal Mouffe, For a Left 
Populism (London: Verso, 2018).  
17 For a similar concept of the social, see Duncan Kennedy, “Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 
1850-2000,” in The New Law and Economic Development: A Critical Appraisal, eds. David M. Trubek and Alvaro 
Santos (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 19-73.   
18 For a legal analysis of these issues see Gráinne de Búrca, “Is EU Supranational Governance a Challenge to Liberal 
 Constitutionalism?,” The University of Chicago Law Review 85, no. 2 (March 2018): 337-68. 
19 Cristóbal Rowira Kaltwasser, “The Response of Populism to Dahl's Democratic Dillemas,” Political Studies 62, 
no. 3 (2014): 470-87.  
20 For this point, see Fernanda Nicola, “Editorial. Another view of the Cathedral: What Does the Rule of Crisis 




to the failed economic and social policies of the last decade. An economic policy that promotes 
growth, better jobs and wages, and social inclusion can stem the nationalist-populist tide. 
 
 
II. The Populists at the Gate: The Hungarian and Polish Cases 
In Europe, the main populist threat comes principally from the East. Fewer than fifteen years 
after accession to the European Union, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and 
Bulgaria have witnessed populists come to power. As a recent empirical study shows, the appeal 
of these populist parties has increased quite rapidly in the last two decades.21 Since 2000, when 
populist parties took an average of 9.2% of the national vote, their vote share has tripled, 
reaching 31.6% in 2017.22 An alarming finding of Freedom House’  Nations in Transit Report23 
shows that for the first time since 1995, there are now more consolidated authoritarian regimes 
than consolidated democracies in the region. Hungary now has the lowest ranking in the Central 
European region. Poland’s score reached its lowest point in the survey. Shortly after the global 
financial crisis in 2008, which served as a catalyst for change, alternative economic and political 
ideas emerged and spread through the region.24 Neoliberal economic policies were gradually 
replaced with various statist models of development, combining economic protectionism with 
elements of leftist social welfare policies.25 At the same time, political liberalism has been 
challenged by open flirtation with illiberal26 and authoritarian forms of government.27  
 
Despite sharing many of the core elements of populism, not all populists in Eastern and 
Central Europe are the same.28 Authoritarian populism has so far emerged only in Hungary and 
Poland, the two former front-runners of democratic transition. Authoritarian populism 
combines the key features of populism with essential ingredients of illiberalism: opposition to 
pluralism, the rule of law, and rights of minorities.29 Other countries in the region have yet to 
go down that road. In Slovakia, the nominally left-wing (social-democratic) populist Robert 
Fico lost his absolute majority in 2016 elections and quickly toned down his populist rhetoric. 
Later, in February 2018, the murder of the investigative journalist Jan Kuciak triggered one of 
the largest demonstrations in Bratislava in the post-communist era, resulting in the resignation 
                                                 
21 Martin Eiermann, Yascha Mounk, and Limor Gultchin, “Report. European Populism: Trends, Threats, and 
Future Prospects,” Institute for Global Change, 2017, https://institute.global/insight/renewing-centre/european-
populism-trends-threats-and-future-prospects.   
22 Eiermann, Mounk, and Gultchin, “Report. European Populism: Trends, Threats, and Future Prospects.” 
23 Freedom House, “Nations in Transit 2017 Report. The False Promise of Populism,” 2017, 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/nations-transit-2017.  
24 Tony Barber, “An Illiberal Streak Spreads Further Across Central Europe,” Financial Times, December 8, 2015, 
https://www.ft.com/content/e5f73e48-9cf4-11e5-b45d-4812f209f861. 
25 Anne Applebaum, “Europe’s New Right Sounds Like the Old Left,” Financial Times, January 27, 2016, 
https://www.ft.com/content/cffc9686-c393-11e5-808f-8231cd71622e; Mitchell Orenstein, “Reassessing the Neo-
Liberal Development Model in Central and Eastern Europe,” in Resilient Liberalism in Europe’s Political 
Economy, eds. Vivien Schmidt and Mark Thatcher (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 374-402. 
26 Illiberal democracies are understood here, following Fareed Zakaria, as: “democratically elected regimes, often 
ones that have been reelected or reaffirmed through referenda [that] are routin ly ignoring constitutional limits on 
their power and depriving their citizens of basic rights and freedoms.” See Fareed Zakaria, “The Rise of Illiberal 
Democracy,” Foreign Affairs 76, no. 6 (1997): 22. 
27 Jan-Werner Müller, “Eastern Europe Goes South: Disappearing Democracy in the EU’s Newest Member 
States,” Foreign Affairs 93, no. 2 (2014): 14-19. 
28 Anna Grzymala Busse, “Global Populisms and Their Impact,” Slavic Review 76, no. S1 (August 2017): S3-
S8. 
29 Bart Bonikowski, “Ethno-Nationalist Populism and the Mobilization of Collective Resentment,” The British 
Journal of Sociology 68, no. S1 (2017): 190. 
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of Prime Minister Fico. Although his Smer-SD (Direction-Social Democracy), a national-
populist political formation that employs left-leaning socialist rhetoric, still remains the most 
powerful party in the current governing coalition, the position of Smer-SD has been seriously 
weakened. As a result, in comparison with Hungary and Poland, “Slovakia in recent years has 
represented a less prominent case of the “illiberal turn,” rarely earning a mention in discussions 
of “democratic backsliding.”30 Likewise, populists in the Czech Republic have not yet openly 
embraced illiberalism. The winner of the October 2017 elections in the Czech Republic was 
Andrej Babis, a billionaire populist impatient with the give-and-take of democratic politics, 
although not yet someone with a clear illiberal nationalist programme. His populism rhetoric is 
closer to the plutocratic version of populism espoused by figures like Donald Trump and the 
former Italian Prime minister Silvio Berlusconi, who promised to rid the country of corruption 
and run it like a business.31  
 
In the Central European region, Hungary is the most visible example of authoritarian 
populism. Roughly a decade after Vladimir Putin steered his country toward “Putinism,”32 a 
new ideology aspiring to represent a Russian alternative to Western liberal order, Hungary 
followed in these footsteps. Hungary, a successful leader of transformation in the 1990s, had a 
current account deficit of €1.9 million in 2000, but €5.8 million by 2006; the country also 
became highly indebted and by 2009, its had debt reached 79% of GDP. Unemployment rose 
to 10% by 2010. Among the first countries in Europe, Hungary was bailed out by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the EU.33 Because of the austerity measures introduced 
to reestablish financial order, a great part of the population suffered huge losses.34 Th  crisis 
situation that characterized most of the country between 2008 and 2016 may be compared to 
waking up from a sweet dream to the gloomy reality for a great part of the population. All of 
the sudden, millions of people turned against following obediently Brussels. As Andrea Pirro 
explains, it was the deterioration of the Hungarian economy combined with the perception of 
undemocratic nature of the European architecture, which boosted Fid sz’s nationalism and 
Euroskepticism.35 
 
When Orbán came to power in 2010, he inherited a spiralling deficit and a €20 billio n 
IMF bailout programme. The Fidesz agenda was to overturn neoliberal economic policies. The 
government reshaped the country’s taxation system, introducing, on the one hand, a flat-rate 
16% income and imposing, on the other hand, crisis taxes on telecom, energy, media, and 
financial sectors on the other. The government also nationalised compulsory private pension 
                                                 
30 Grigorij Meseznikov and Olg'a Gyarfašova, “Slovakia's Conflicting Camps,” Journal of Democracy 29, no. 3, 
(July 2018): 88. 
31 Jiri Pehe, “Czech Democracy Under Pressure,” Journal of Democracy 29, no. 3 (July 2018): 71. 
32 Putinism represents a mixture of economic statism, political authoritarianism and Russian Orthodox 
fundamentalism. Putin’s economic nationalism is strongly embedded in his “conservative revolution,” 
emphasizing the importance of Russian national “character” being at odds with traditional liberal values and 
principles. See Anne Applebaum, “Putinism: The Ideology,” LSE, February 2013, 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/ideas/Assets/Documents/updates/LSE-IDEAS-Putinism-The-Ideology.pdf.  
33 Kate Connolly and Ian Traynor, “Hungary Receives Rescue Package, with Strings Attached,” The Guardian, 
October 29, 2008, https://www.theguardian.com/business/2008/oct/29/hungary-economy-imf-eu-world-bank. 
34 As Claire Kilpatrick argues, “a key political priority of the newly elected Orbán government was to reduce 
public debt and deficit without resorting to typical austerity measures.” Even though the Orbán government used 
atypical deficit reduction measures, they still had dramatic effect on social rights. See Claire Kilpatrick, 
“Constitutions, Social Rights and Sovereign Debt States in Europe: A Challenging New Area of Constitutional 
Inquiry,” Law 2015/34, EUI Working Papers. 
35 Andrea L.P. Pirro, The Populist Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe: Ideology, Impact, and Electoral 
Performance (New York: Routledge, 2015), 149.  
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funds, opening up a public revenue stream that has reduced the deficit. Since then, Orbán has 
forced utilities to reduce household bills and has required lossmaking banks to pay €3 billio n 
in compensation to bank customers who took out foreign currency mortgages. Such populist 
measures helped his Fidesz party win another term in office in 2014.   
 
Orbán has denounced the West as decadent and obsessed with money, and outlined a 
future Hungarian state—a “work based society.” Orbán called his approach, adopted after his 
2010 election victory, the ‘Eastern winds’ approach to economic policy, to distinguish it from 
Western liberalism.36 The key pillars of Orbán’s new economic policy were re-nationalisation 
of certain private companies, mostly in what he considered to be strategic sectors like oil 
(MOL), gas, utilities and banks, punitive taxation of foreign banks and insurance companies, 
and economic protectionism. The Orbán government’s ‘Eastern winds’ approach, while 
officially an economic policy, has from the beginning been heavily imbued with the implication 
of political and social transformation away from Western liberalism and individualism toward 
Eastern authoritarianism and collectivism. After Viktor Orbán's speech in Tusnádfürdö, it 
became more than clear that he wants to create an illiberal state, a different kind of constitutional 
order from liberal democracy.37 The Orbán government has transformed Hungary into a semi-
authoritarian regime that limits freedom of speech and assembly, curtails media pluralism, and 
undermines protection of minorities. Orbán has also curbed the independence of the courts, the 
civil service, and other institutions essential to the rule of law.38  
 
The novelty and irony of the Hungarian slide into authoritarianism is that it was achieved 
entirely through legal means. Due to its two-thirds majority in the Hungarian unicameral 
parliament (Diet), Fidesz faced few obstacles in achieving this “constitutional revolution.”39  
When there arose a need to change the rules of the game, the Hungarian parliament was able to 
simply amend the Constitution. In Hungary, the new populist government managed with 
relative ease to render the courts toothless by packing them with loyalists and curtailing their 
independence. The populists understood very well that by displacing the Constitutional Court, 
the core of the rule of law, they removed the major obstacle to the fulfillment of their 
aspirations. The once powerful and highly respected Court for the moment disappeared from 
the political scene.40 After neutralizing the Constitutional Court, the populist government 
continued its legal “revolution” with attacks on lower (regular) courts: it lowered the judicial 
retirement age, allowing Orbán to remove most of the presidents of the courts and replace them 
with judges more to his liking. 
 
At the moment, the Hungarian version of authoritarian populism represents the most 
problematic example of this trend in the region. The Fidesz government achieved a fundamental 
revision of the rules of the constitutional and political order in Hungary. In a scant eight years, 
it managed to transform Hungary from one of the success stories of the transition from socialism 
to democracy into a semi-authoritarian regime, where the new constitutional structure vests so 
                                                 
36 “Orban and the Wind from the East,” The Economist, November 14, 2011, https://www.economist.com/eastern-
approaches/2011/11/14/orban-and-the-wind-from-the-east.  
37 Kester Edy, “EU Urged to Monitor Hungary as Orban Hits at ‘Liberal Democracy’,” Financial Times, July 30, 
2014, https://www.ft.com/content/0574f7f2-17f3-11e4-b842-00144feabdc0.  
38 Mikl ふs Bánkuti, Gábor Halmai, and Kim Lane Scheppele, “From Separation of Powers to a Government without 
Checks: Hungary’s Old and New Constitution,” in Constitution for a Disunited Nation: On Hungary's 2011 
Fundamental Law, ed. Gábor Attila Tóth (Budapest: Central University Press, 2012), 268; Mikl ふs Bánkuti, Gábor 
Halmai, and Kim Lane Scheppele, “Disabling the Constitution,” Journal of Democracy 23, no. 3 (2012): 138-41. 
39 Kim Lane Scheppele, “Constitutional Coups and Judicial Review: How Transnational Institutions Ca 
Strenghten Peak Courts at Times of Crisis,” Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 23 (2014): 51-117. 
40 Bánkuti, Halmai, and Scheppele, “Disabling the Constitution,” 140. 
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much power in the centralized executive that no real checks and balances exist to restrain this 
power. Despite the authoritarian turn, in 2018, Orbán secured his third successive election 
victory on the back of record turnout—and won another two-thirds majority which will allow 
Fidesz to change the Constitution again and further entrench its power.   
 
In Poland, the new right-wing and populist Law and Justice (PiS) government has also set 
out to exploit a mix of ethnic nationalism and anti-capitalism reminiscent of that present in the 
interwar period, when authoritarianism—masquerading as democracy—prevailed in Admiral 
Miklós Horthy’s Hungary and Marshal Józef Piłsudski’s Poland. After winning the majority of 
votes in 2015 elections, Poland joined Hungary on its path to authoritarian populism.41  
 
In Poland, the best economic performer in the region, it was primarily the poor, old and 
unemployed who helped to elect the new right-wing government. PiS promised a family 
allowance of $130 a month per child, funded through a tax on banks and big business; a 
minimum wage; and a return to a retirement age of 60 for women and 65 for men. Despite the 
robust economic performance, the previous governing party, the neoliberal Civil Platform (PO) 
had left behind many regions like Silesia, as well as working people on so-called junk contracts 
earning less than $200 a month. The millions of Poles in the small towns and poorer regions of 
“Polska B” “felt themselves to be marginalized and left behind by the bulldozer of economic 
liberalism. They were also, it’s important to add, alienated by the social liberalism, on issues 
such as abortion, gender, and sexual orientation, which came with the opening to Western 
Europe.”42 As Mitchell Orenstein and Bojan Bugarič observe, the new family allowance was 
huge boon for many:   
 
For the many hundreds of thousands of working parents earning only 2,000–
2,500 złotys a month, this meant a sudden untaxed pay raise of twenty or even 
forty percent. Within a year, children living in extreme poverty declined by a 
third. Single mothers found themselves able to quit overly exploitative jobs and 
seek other options. Though such individual largesse comes at the expense of 
long-term projects like improving child-care networks and pre-schools, it is 
clearly a social policy that has helped many and proved tremendously popular.43  
 
Even economically liberal Financial Times reports that these policies have “also earned 
Poland the top spot in Oxfam’s latest index of social spending designed to reduce inequality.” 
Moreover, the Financial Times also argues that “[o]n the issues that voters care about, most 
voters agree with Law and Justice—and Law and Justice has delivered on those issues.”44 
 
Like in Hungary, the first institutional target of the new Polish government was the 
Constitutional Tribunal. As a result of a series of changes, the Constitutional Tribunal, “as  
mechanism of constitutional review has ceased to exist: a reliable aide of the government and 
                                                 
41 R. Daniel Kelemen, “Poland's Constitutional Crisis: How the Law and Justice Party is Threatening Democracy,” 
Foreign Affairs, August 25, 2016, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/poland/2016-08-25/polands-
constitutional-crisis.  
42 Timothy Garton Ash, “Is Europe Disintegrating?,” The New York Review of Books, January 19, 2017, 
https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2017/01/19/is-europe-disintegrating/.  
43 Mitchell Orenstein and Bojan Bugarič, “Economic Causes (and Policies) of Populism in Eastern Europe,”  
European Consortium for Political Research, Hamburg, August 23, 2018  
https://ecpr.eu/MyEcpr/MyEvent.aspx?EventID=115.  
44 James Shoter and Evon Huber, “Handouts Help Poland's Voters Look Past EU Fight,” The Financial Times, 
October 18, 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/4805fd6c-d119-11e8-a9f2-7574db66bcd5.  
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parliamentary majority was born.”45 After neutralizing the Constitutional Tribunal, the Polish 
government prepared three bills, recently adopted by the Sejm, which aim to control and capture 
the Supreme Court and the vast majority of other regular courts.46 The new Law and Justice 
government also undermined Poland’s independent civil service and adopted new legislation 
seeking to bring the media under direct government control.47   
     
These legal and economic changes are part of a broader conservative political program 
founded upon a set of moral values that purportedly serve the protection of the Polish nation. 48  
As Leszek Koczanowicz argues, PiS “aims not only to transform certain external conditions, 
but also to accomplish a comprehensive re-invention of mentality and radically re-direct the 
trajectory of social thinking.”49 A combination of nationalism with social welfarism secures 
extremely high popularity of the ruling PiS party in Poland. According to Aleks Szczerbiak 
“many Poles feel that, while politicians have often promised to help the less well-off, Law and 
Justice is the first party to actually deliver on these pledges on such a scale.”50 
The new populism in Hungary and Poland differs from other populisms in Europe because it 
combines the elements of populism, ethno-nationalism and authoritarianism. While ethno-
nationalism is present in most of Western European cases, it is the third element, 
authoritarianism, which sets the Hungarian and Polish type of populism apart from other 
European cases. Authoritarianism in the Hungarian and Polish context does not mean only the 
adoption of certain authoritarian values,51 such as stringent security and intolerance of 
multiculturalism and pluralism, but also a “style of governance that attempts to circumvent the 
rule of law and democratic norms in favor of centralized authority and limited political 
freedom.”52 Authoritarian populists in Hungary and Poland are explicitly anti-liberal but not 
necessarily anti-democratic.53 They embrace the “form” of democracy and claim to speak for 
the people themselves, but, at the same time—by undermining its liberal constitutional 
foundations—they erode the substance of democracy and gradually transform it into various 
forms of illiberal and authoritarian regimes.54  
What differentiates Orbán and Kaczynski from other populists in Europe is the extent to 
which they oppose liberal democracy. They have gone much further in subverting liberal 
                                                 
45 Wojciech Sadurski, “How Democracy Dies (in Poland): A Case Study of Anti-Constitutional Populist 
Backsliding in Poland,” Sydney Law School Research Paper No.18/1 (2018), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3103491.    
46 Sadurski.    
47 Jan-Werner Müller, “The Problem with Poland,” The New York Review of Books, February 11, 2016, 
http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2016/02/11/kaczynski-eu-problem-with-poland/. 
48 Joanna Fomina and Jacek Kucharczyk, “Populism and Protest in Poland,” Journal of Democracy 27, no. 4 
(2016): 61.  
49 Leszek Koczanowicz, “The Polish Case. Community and Democracy under the PiS,” New Left Review 102 
(2016): 94. 
50 Aleks Szczerbiak, “Why is Poland’s Law and Justice Government so Popular?,” The Polish Politics Blog, 
October 26, 2017, https://polishpoliticsblog.wordpress.com/2017/10/26/why-is-polands-law-and-justice-
government-so-popular/; see also Remi Adekoya, “Why Poland’s Law and Justice Party Remains so Popular?,” 
Foreign Affairs, November 3, 2017, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/central-europe/2017-11-03/why-
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51 Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart adopt such approach in defining authoritarian populism, see Pippa Norris and 
Ronald Inglehart, Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit and Authoritarian Populism (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2018).  
52 Bart Bonikowski, “Ethno-Nationalist Populism and the Mobilization of Collective Resentment,” The British 
Journal of Sociology 68, no. 1 (2017): 189-90. 
53 Anna Grzymala Busse, “Global Populisms and Their Impact,” S3. 
54 Müller, “Eastern Europe Goes South,” 15 XX.   
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democracy than most of the other populists in East-Central Europe. With a skillful invocation 
of conservative and authoritarian ideology, combined with the absence of a strong opposition, 
they mounted a successful crusade again liberalism. Irena Grudzinska-Gross writes about “the 
revival in Poland, Hungary and…some other countries of the region, of the very old 
conservative style of government, including the resurrection of the extreme right wing 
movements and, in Poland, of religious fundamentalism.”55 Iván Szelényi and Tamás Csillag 
argue that this drift to illiberalism and authoritarianism has also a legitimating ideology, a 
traditionalist/neoconservative ideology, which emphasizes the value of patriotism, religion, and 
traditional family values. They maintain that a combination of political illiberalism, economic 
statism and conservative ideology represents the building blocks of a new type of order in post-
communist world: A managed illiberal capitalism.56 Because of these additional features, this 
form of populism has strong authoritarian inclination. 
 
 
III. The EU to the Rescue?  
 
Some observers argue that the existence of international organizations such as the European 
Union makes the backsliding currently underway in Poland and Hungary quite different from 
the “constitutional coups” of earlier eras.57 One of the most crucial political questions facing 
Europe today is how well the EU is equipped, legally and politically, to defend democracy and 
the rule of law in its Member States. It is therefore necessary to examine how the EU is 
managing its first real attempts at safeguarding democracy within Member States. A political 
club of democratic regimes established primarily to pr mote peace and prosperity in postwar 
Europe, the EU must now confront Member States that are turning away from liberal 
democracy. EU law currently offers three legal options for dealing with cases such as those of 
Hungary and Poland. 
  
The first is to invoke Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the so-called 
nuclear option, which lays out a procedure for determining whether a Member State has violated 
the values stated in Article 2 and, if so, allows for the suspension of certain rights. This 
provision was first introduced in the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam (amending the 1992 Maastricht 
Treaty), which states that in cases where there has been a “serious and persistent breach” of the 
“principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the 
rule of law,” the Council of the European Union can “suspend certain…rights…including the 
voting rights of the representative of the government of that Member State in the Council.” In 
December 2017, the European Commission launched Article 7 proceedings against Poland for 
breaching European common values and rule of law.58 And most recently, in September 2018, 
the European Parliament has voted to trigger the EU’s most serious disciplinary procedure 
against Hungary, saying the country’s government poses a “systematic threat” to democracy 
and the rule of law. The vote was carried with the support of 448 MEPs, narrowly clearing the 
                                                 
55 Irena Grudzinska-Gross, “The Backsliding,” East European Politics and Societies and Cultures 28, no. 4 (2014): 
664. 
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of Society and Politics 1, no. 1 (2015): 1-27. 
57 Kim Lane Scheppele, “Constitutional Coups and Judicial Review.”  
58 For a more comprehensive overview of the EU legal approaches to Poland and Hungary, see Laurent Pech and 
Kim Lane Scheppele, “Illiberalism Within: Rule of Law Backsliding in the EU,” Cambridge Yearbook of 
European Legal Studies, 19 (2017): 3–47, and R. Daniel Kelemen and Kim Lane Scheppele, “Defending 
Democracy in EU Member States: Beyond Article 7 TEU,” this volume.  
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required two-thirds majority, after Hungary’s prime minister, Viktor Orbán, was abandoned by 
many of his allies in the centre-ight European People’s Party (EPP). The crucial problem of 
Article 7 is that in order to employ the preventing mechanism,  Article 7 requires a majority of 
four-fifths of the Council and assent of the European Parliament. The sanctioning mechanism, 
on the other hand, requires even higher threshold, i.e. unanimity in the Council and assent of 
the European Parliament. Hence, it is highly unlikely that Article 7 will ever be used against 
countries like Hungary or Poland.   
 
The EU’s second legal option for dealing with countries veering off the democratic path 
is detailed in Article 258 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 
Article 258 states that if the European Commission finds that a Member State has “failed to 
fulfil an obligation under the Treaties” and that State then fails to rectify the matter, the 
Commission “may bring the matter before the Court of Justice of the European Union [CJEU].” 
This is what has happened in the cases of Hungary and Poland.  
 
To focus on Hungary, the Commission has brought several separate suits against Hungary 
under Article 258 TFEU. The most interesting case involved a provision in Hungary’s 
Transitional Act on the implementation of the 2012 Constitution, which lowered the retirement 
age of judges from seventy to sixty-two. This provision would have forced 274 judges and 
public prosecutors into retirement in a short period of time. The Commission considered the 
rule to be a violation of the independence of the judiciary. For strategic reasons, it decided to 
utilize very narrow legal grounds to deal with the case: It relied exclusively on Council 
Directive 2000/78/EC on equal treatment in employment, which prohibits discrimination on 
grounds of age. In November 2012, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled that the radical 
lowering of the retirement age for Hungarian judges constituted age discrimination and violated 
Council Directive 2000/78/EC.59  
 
Despite this legal victory, the retired judges were never comprehensively reinstated, and 
Fidesz loyalists basically stayed in place. As Jan-Werner Müller argues, in the end “Europe 
appeared impotent in getting at the real issue, which was political and had nothing to do with 
the discrimination [against] individuals.”60 Separate legal proceedings such as this 
discrimination suit may yield important legal victories, but they ultimately fail to address the 
broader institutional issues that threaten the foundations of the rule of law and liberal democracy 
in Hungary.  
 
The final option in the EU’s legal arsenal is the Rule of Law Framework. The 
Framework was adopted in 2014, mainly in response to the inability of the key EU actors to 
agree on invoking Article 7. Often called the “pre–Article 7 procedure,” the Rule of Law 
Framework complements Article 7 by establishing a structured “preparatory” phase for taking 
Article 7 actions. The Commission first assesses whether there is a systemic threat to the rule 
of law in a specific country. It then sends a “rule-of-law opinion” to the Member State in 
question as a basis for dialogue to resolve the issue. If that Member State ignores the opinion, 
the Commission then issues a “rule-of-law recommendation” and monitors the country’s 
follow-up. If it is ultimately unsatisfied with the country’s response, the Commission may 
decide to activate Article 7.  
 
                                                 
59 Case C-286/12, Commission v. Hungary, ECLI:EU:C:2012:687.  
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The Framework’s greatest shortcoming is that it offers little in the way of viable sanctions 
that can be used before the activation of Article 7. When Poland was investigated under the 
Framework in 2016, Prime Minister Szydło made it clear that her government was not worried 
about the inquiry. Moreover, she did not shy away from expressing strong contempt toward 
Brussels’ action, calling the investigation an “ideological threat” to Poland’s national 
sovereignty.61  
 
For now, it seems as though little can be expected from EU legal actions aimed at 
protecting the rule of law in Member States. Writing about “subnational authoritarianism,” 
Daniel Kelemen argues that “legal levers alone are unlikely to safeguard democracy…So long 
as political leaders are willing to put partisan interests above democratic values, they may allow 
…autocracy to persist for decades within otherwise democratic political systems.”62 This holds 
true at the supranational (EU) and national (Member State) levels as well. It will take bold 




IV. From Legal to Economic Sanctions? 
 
Article 7 would likely be far more effective if it included the possibility of economic sanctions, 
which would weigh heavily on a country such as Hungary that is heavily dependent on EU 
structural funds. In 2012, Orbán declared that Hungary “will not be a colony” of the EU. But 
he had no qualms about signing a six-year budget agreement with the EU that will provide 
nearly $40 billion in aid for Hungary (whose annual GDP is $125 billion) between 2014 and 
2020. Poland also benefits substantially from EU aid. On October 5, 2014, the New York Times 
reported that Poland (whose 2013 GDP was $518 billion), would receive a total of $318 billion 
in EU aid between 2008 and 2020. This is more than two times the present-day value of the 
Marshall Plan. The annual average accorded to each Marshall Plan recipient for four years was 
$2.5 billion. By 2020, Poland will be receiving $26.5 billion per year.  
 
 These aid deals should be a great source of leverage for the EU. Yet studies suggest that 
economic sanctions seldom work.63 In the case of the EU, a big reason why “economic 
sanctions have fallen short in the past is that not all countries have complied. Indeed, significant 
differences of domestic opinion in the imposing country often undermine sanctions as well.”64 
Therefore, future attempts at imposing economic sanctions should be backed by a strong 
regional consensus. In light of current events, however, achieving consensus is no small task. 
Even the EU institutions themselves have not agreed on a common language for the Hungarian 
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and Polish cases. The EU’s flawed approach to Hungary has already damaged the Union’s 
political legitimacy, while the Eurozone crisis, the migration crisis, Brexit, and Russia’s 
occupation of Crimea and other parts of Ukraine have left the EU more politically divided than 
ever before. Needless to say, in such a fragile union, consensus on sanctions may remain 
elusive.  
 
Like other international organizations, the EU is more likely to exert pressure on a 
Member State when foreign interests are at stake; it is less likely to intervene over matters of 
domestic policy and “the internal functioning of democracy, such as curtailment of press 
freedoms, corruption in public administration, and the centralization of power in the hands of 
the ruling party,”65 in part because it is in the EU’s interest to maintain stability and also because 
the issue of national sovereignty is delicate. While the EU has made massive encroachments on 
the fiscal sovereignty of Member States (with the Fiscal Compact, the European Stability 
Mechanism, and the “Six Pack” and “Two Pack” legislation), it is more reluctant to impinge on 
national sovereignty when it comes to sensitive social or political matters.  This contrast 
between fiscal and sociopolitical measures reflects the limits of EU integration toward a 
stronger political union. EU institutions and elites seem to lack the same enthusiasm and 
political will for protecting fundamental values such as democracy and the rule of law as they 
displayed for dealing with the Eurozone crisis.  
 
V. From Sanctions to Alternative Economic and Social Policies 
 
Instead of focusing only on sanctions, European political leaders should articulate a coherent 
alternative to the failed neoliberal economic policies of the last decade. What counts this time 
are sensible economic, social and environmental policies promising to improve daily lives of 
European citizens. The EU needs to regain credibility by delivering simple and palpable 
benefits, such as good salaries, decent pensions, high-quality social services, and high 
environmental standards. In other words, it needs to improve what political theorists define as 
“output legitimacy.”66  Only an economic policy that promotes growth, better jobs, wages, and 
social inclusion can stem the nationalist tide. To prevent history from repeating itself, Europe 
must act now.  
 
Since the beginning of the Eurozone crisis in 2009, governments across Europe have 
single-mindedly embraced fiscal austerity.67 This has meant double-digit government spending 
cuts, and the elevation of the austerity paradigm spearheaded by German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel to an essentially ‘unbreakable law.’ The new Fiscal Compact, a treaty signed by all EU 
members except the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic, effectively outlaws the counter-
cyclical economic policies espoused by Keynesianism, and establishes aust rity and balanced 
budgets as the new fundamental principles of the EU constitutional order.68 Lacking the 
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unanimous support of all the Member States, the Fiscal Compact could not be adopted as an 
amendment to the EU treaties. Instead, it took the form of a separate inter-governmental treaty, 
requiring ratification by at least twelve Eurozone members (Article 14 TSCG) to take effect. 
The Fiscal Compact was only the last in a series of constitutional and legislative measures 
adopted by EU political leaders with the intent to “solve” the Eurozone crisis.69   As most of the 
other measures initiated by the German-led, center-right coalition of political forces, the Fiscal 
Compact subscribed to a now-dominant economic “theory” of austerity which informs most of 
its rules. Namely, the main culprits for the euro crisis, according to this theory, are profligate 
governments and their public sectors. As a consequence, the only hope to discipline such 
“irresponsible” governments is to impose strict fiscal rules (balanced budgets) preventing the 
further increase of budget deficits and public debt.   
 
The Fiscal Compact deviates from traditional EU values of democracy, institutional 
balance, and the equality of Member States.70 It empowers European bureaucrats, judges, and 
bankers at the expense of European citizens. Instead of using an ordinary revision procedure 
for Treaty amendments (Article 48 of TEU) or enhanced cooperation as provided for in Article 
20 TEU and in Articles 326 to 334 of the TFEU, the Fiscal Compact was adopted outside the 
EU law, as a separate international treaty. As a consequence, it could bypass the more 
democratic and transparent procedure provided for in the EU law, in particular the participation 
of the European Parliament and the national parliaments. Only Ireland put the Fiscal Compact 
to democratic debate, through a referendum, but it did so because of the requirements of the 
Irish constitution.71 As an international treaty, the Fiscal Compact also side-stepped the 
independent judicial review, separation of powers, and respect for fundamental rights of EU 
law.72 Furthermore, it entered into force when it was ratified only by twelve out of seventeen 
members of the Eurozone, which clearly deviates from the established consensual principles 
among the Member States. As Simon Hix, one of the leading experts on the EU political system, 
contends, any decision with significant redistributive consequences requires a strong sense of 
political legitimacy for the decision to be accepted by those to whom it applies. Given all of 
these flaws, therefore, it comes as no surprise that Hix concludes that the Fiscal Compact lacks 
the political legitimacy.73 Agustín José Menéndez, a prominent EU legal scholar, goes even 
further and argues that the Fiscal Compact is unconstitutional: “By taking fundamental 
decisions on the way European competences are organized and executed outside EU treaties, 
Member States are opting out of Union law. They are therefore undermining the integrity of 
EU law.”74 
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Even more problematic are the substantive legal aspects of the Fiscal Compact. As 
recounted above, the Compact, in essence, entrenches a certain economic theory at the level of 
constitutional law. Thus, for the first time in the EU history, the EU constitution explicitly 
biases the content of decision-making in the direction of neoliberalism-liberal bias in the EU 
legal order, the new Austerity Union in the making does this in a more explicit and profound 
way, leaving almost no room for a discretionary fiscal policy to Member States. 
 
While it is true that the Fiscal Compact mostly reproduces already existing provisions of 
EU law,75 its importance should not be underestimated. The core provision of the Fiscal 
Compact (Article 3) contains a ‘structural budget deficit’ rule that requires that the country’s 
structural deficit not exceed 0.5 per cent of GDP. To elaborate: Article 3 stipulates that the 
budgetary position of the general government of a Contracting Party shall be balanced or in 
surplus. This is interpreted as the annual structural balance of the general government at its 
country-specific medium-term objective, as defined in the revised Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP),76 with a lower limit of a structural deficit (a deficit calculated using a cyclically adjusted 
budget balance corrected for one-off and temporary measures) of 0.5 % of GDP at market 
prices, i.e. market price for sovereign debt). The aim of this “golden rule” of balanced budgets 
is to ensure stricter budgetary discipline among the EU governments. Another element of the 
Fiscal Compact is the so-called “debt brake” (“schuldenbremse”) contained in Article 4, 
modeled upon the German constitutional provision that requirs the federal government to 
reduce its structural deficit to 0.35 % of GDP by 2016.77 Under Article 4, Member States with 
government debt ratios in excess of 60% of GDP are to reduce their debt ratios in line with a 
numerical benchmark, which implies a decline of the amount by which their debt exceeds the 
threshold at a rate in the order of 1/20th per year over three years. Consequently, countries with 
a debt ratio exceeding 60% of GDP are subject to strict rules. The Fiscal Compact (following 
the ‘Six Pack’) makes it possible for the European Commission to open an excessive deficit 
procedure under Article 126 TFEU on the basis of the debt criterion. It also places compliance 
with its budgetary and other requirements under the jurisdiction of the European Court of 
Justice, which can fine countries up to 0.1 % of their GDP if they do not transpose correctly the 
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balanced budget rules. This jurisdiction represents an unprecedented constitutional intrusion, 
since the European Court of Justice has never had the power to interpret national constitutions 
of the Member States; the ECJ will be asked to decide on intricate issues of national 
constitutional law, which directly implicates the will of the people contained in national 
constitutions.78   
 
The Member State signatories are required to implement the Fiscal Compact with new 
provisions “of binding force and permanent character,” preferably in their constitutions.79 As a 
consequence, the economic theory of austerity will be constitutionalised on both the EU and 
national level; Keynesianism is ruled out precisely when it is most needed. Hence, the new 
Austerity Union will be almost impossible to change. The Fiscal Compact instrumentalizes 
national constitutional law for the benefit of the Union law “to a degree not seen before.”80 As 
Menéndez critically argues, national constitutions leave no room for the transfer of sovereignty 
to mere inter-governmental processes, yet this has precisely what has been accomplished 
through the Fiscal Compact and the introduction of constitutional amendments via the Fiscal 
Compact. The very choice of form is, according to Menéndez, a breach of national 
constitutional law,81 and results in the amendment of the “pouvoir constitutant” of the Member 
States.82      
Beyond the form, as Antonio Estella argues, the new rules of EU economic governance 
(Fiscal Compact, Six Pack and Two Pack.) represent “an unprecedented turn to rigidity in the 
history of the evolution of the SGP.”83 The new rules restrict the fiscal policy of Member States 
even more so than the rules from before the euro crisis.  The new rules st ik  “at the heart of 
the institutions of parliamentary democracy by dislocating as a matter of constitutional principle 
the budgetary autonomy of the Member States.”84 To put even more pressure on Member States, 
access to financial assistance under European Stability Mechanism (ESM)85 is conditional on 
prior ratification of the Fiscal Compact. After the European Court of Justice ruling in the 
Pringle case,86 where the Court basically constitutionalised the principle of strict conditionality 
contained in the ESM Treaty, countries seeking financial assistance from the ESM will be 
subjected to even more explicit forms of fiscal retrenchment imposed through the Memoranda 
of Understanding which struggling Member States have to “negotiate” with the Troika made 
up of the European Commission, the International Monetary Fund, and the European Central 
Bank.87 
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The Fiscal Compact has brought not only a deep intrusion into the fiscal maneuvering 
room of the Member States. It is also too rigid and too restrictive in terms of its budgetary and 
fiscal rules. Although many of its rules are ambiguous, that does not solve the problem of 
rigidity of its main “targets,” i.e. rules on the allowed structural budget deficit and public debt. 
The European Macro Group—three European macroeconomic institutes: IMK from 
Düsseldorf, WIFO from Vienna and OFCD from Paris—prepared a joint study on the impact 
of austerity measures, reinforced by the Fiscal Compact. As the study shows,88 fe  of the EU 
countries undergoing severe economic crisis are able to implement the rules without seriously 
undermining their prospects for future economic growth. Their detrimental effect can also be 
clearly seen from those countries which are used as role models for fiscal discipline.  
Switzerland, which first introduced the debt brake in 2003, today has indeed a very low debt-
to-GDP ratio, but its levels of public investments are among the lowest in the developed 
world.89 Germany, the main “exporter” of balanced budget rules and debt brakes also faces a 
critical lack of public investment in areas such as green energy and education. 
 
It is no surprise that the EU’s Austerity Union has been criticized from many quarters. At 
the height of the euro crisis, authors like Wolfgang Streeck, Fritz Scharpf, and Perry Anderson 
described the situation in bailout countries as  sovereignty “on paper,”90 an “occupation regime 
by the “Troika” [of the European Commission, International Monetary Fund, and European 
Central Bank],91 and a Troika diktat regime “reminiscent of Austria in 1922, when the Entente, 
under League of Nations colors, posted a high commissioner to Vienna to run the economy.”92 
Others have observed that both the management of the euro crisis and the Fiscal Compact have 
deepened the divide between the Union core and periphery in the Union. Damian Chalmers 
observes the differentiated impact of the Fiscal Compact on two different groups of countries: 
those few like Germany, Finland, Luxemburg, and Estonia who already have a balanced budget 
will not be particularly affected; and the overwhelming majority of others that will face very 
demanding requirements.93 Needless to say, countries like Greece, Portugal, and Spain may in 
fact, in the end, achieve their required deficit and debt targets but the cost are already 
prohibitively high. Greece, for example, a country ranked 18th according to the UN Human 
Development Index in 2008, is today on the verge of a humanitarian crisis. Even such pro-EU 
figures as Jacques Delors have fiercely criticised the Fiscal Compact. In a speech in the 
European Parliament, Delors referred to the Fiscal Compact as a gas factory (“usine a gaz”).94  
The problem is that this myopic austerity focus rests on a misdiagnosis of the euro crisis, 
has backfired economically, and has triggered grave social and economic repercussions in 
indebted countries.95 Nevertheless, austerity remains the virtually unchallenged “official” EU 
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economic doctrine. What Europe needs more than anything is a new anti-auster ty coalition. 
focused on growth and social justice. Only a Europe willing to revert back to some basic 
Keynesian policies of economic stimulus, as the US government did at the outset of Barack 
Obama’s presidency, combined with economic innovations that include much-needed 
investments in infrastructure, education, and social programs, can restore Europe to stability, 
and reverse its dangerous nationalist surge.  
 
In order to achieve this objective, a fiscal and political Union might not be the best 
alternative. As Ashoka Mody convincingly explains, it is naïve to expect that only a further 
federalization of “incomplete” monetary Union could solve the accumulated problems of the 
Eurozone economies:   
 
Today many hope that, spurred by French President Emmanuel Macron’s call 
for euro area reform, Merkel will work on repairing the euro area’s 
architecture. Such a hope is illusory. Merkel is all too aware that any sign of 
financial generosity toward Europe will embolden the rebels within the CDU. 
Other northern nations have made clear that they will oppose calls on their 
taxpayers (Rutte 2018, Finance Ministers 2018). No euro area nation state is 
willing to cede its national parliament’s sovereignty on fiscal matters. Policy 
decisions will remain disengaged from politics. Hence, even if new financial 
arrangements are engineered, it will be impossible to achieve accountability 
in euro area governance. Political tensions will continue to build.96 
 
Instead of looking for “more Europe,” Mody suggests, European leaders should shift their 
attention to domestic public rebellions. 
 
For too long, euro area leaders have dismissed or denigrated the domestic public 
rebellions.This is a terrible mistake. However inchoate, and sometimes nationalistic and 
xenophobic, these rebellions have been, they convey an important message. In addition to the 
distress the euro directly inflicts, the single currency distracts European leaders’ attention from 
where it ought to be directed: domestic priorities. Of special importance is strengthening human 
capital, a capability in which all southern euro area countries (and even some northern 
countries) are lagging behind world leaders. Investment in human capital is crucial to achieving 
greater equity and sense of fairness while helping to regain international competitiveness. 
Put simply, European leaders must shift their efforts away from the ultimately impossible 
goal of making euro area governance more accountable and towards national domestic 
economic agendas that give hope to those who feel disenfranchised. If they fail to make this 
shift, domestic politics will continue to fragment, and as that happens, European politics will 
become ever more corrosive.97 
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Barry Eichengreen offers another economic explanation on why only a re-
nationalization of fiscal policy can stem the tide of European populism.98 His core thesis is that 
the evidence for large cross-border spillovers of national fiscal policies is weak. At the same 
time, the core questions of fiscal policy—whom to tax, how to tax, and how much to tax—are 
one of the most sensitive political and social questions, which are quintessentially national 
prerogatives. When cross-country spillovers are small but national preferences differ, the best 
option is to leave the decision-making at the national level. He concludes: “For fiscal policy 
then, the appropriate reform is less Europe, not more Europe.”99 
 
Similarly, Vivien Schmidt notes that “the EU needs to give back to the member-states the 
flexibility they have had in the past to devise policies that work for them.”100 To this end, a 
more bottom-up and flexible reinterpretation of the rules of Eurozone governance is required: 
“[T]he Eurozone already has an amazing architecture of economic coordination, reaching into 
all the Eurozone ministries of finance and country economic experts. Why not use that 
coordination to ensure that countries themselves determine what works for their very specific 
economic growth models and varieties of capitalism?.”101 The existing framework of the 
European Semester,102 redesigned in this way, could help Member States to get back on the 
path of sustainable growth. The fiscal councils could be supplemented by new competitiveness 
councils to act more as industrial policy councils rather than structural adjustment hawks; in 
Schmidt’s words, “such a bottom-up approach is likely not only to promote better economic 
performance but also much more democratic legitimacy at the national level. This is because it 
would put responsibility for the country’s economics back in national government’s hands at 
the same time that it would encourage more legitimising deliberation at the EU level.”103 But 
in order to be redesigned in the suggested way, the European Semester would require 
simultaneous changes of SGP rules as well. As Mark Dawson argues, the European Semester 
“was envisaged as a measure to buttress and strengthen the Eurozone economy in particular and 
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to recognise the need for heightened EU supervision of domestic budgets.”104 As a result, it is 
deeply embedded in the balanced budget fundamentalism of the SGP.105  
 
However, none of these suggested reforms will work if the troubled countries remain 
overburdened by excessive debt and if they are left bereft of significant investment funds 
provided by banks or the state. For all this, the European Stability Mechanism is simply not 
enough. The EU needs to reinvent new forms of solidarity. As Schmidt suggests, new 
instruments such as Eurobonds, Europe-wide unemployment insurance, EU investment 
resources106 and a EU self–generated budget are needed. The first step in this direction was 
made in 2015 through the establishment of the European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI), 
part of the Investment Plan for Europe (the so-called Juncker Plan).107 EFSI is an initiative 
launched jointly by the European Investment Bank and the European Commission to help 
overcome the current investment gap in the EU. However, as a recent study of the political 
economist Cornel Ban shows,108 most EFSI loans and guarantees so far have gone to countries 
in a relatively strong economic position, with the exception of Italy and Spain, which at the 
time were undergoing steep recessions. In other words, Italy, Spain, France, Germany, and 
Poland received most of the loans, whereas the Baltic countries, Hungary and Romania received 
dramatically less. As a result, “the countercyclical pattern looks quite patchy.”109  
 
One possible lesson to draw from this quite limited example of European “Keynesianism” 
is that the creation of a new anti-austerity coalition will not be an easy task.  As Jeffrey Frieden 
and Stefanie Walter show, the outcome of the crisis has been quite unusual “because the costs 
of the crisis resolution have been borne almost exclusively by the debtor countries and taxpayers 
in the Eurozone.”110 The rift between the debtor and creditor states that emerged as the 
consequence of this outcome implicates “powerful national interests and equally powerful 
particularistic special interests.”111 It is one thing to say that the survival of the Eurozone is in 
the interest of both groups of countries but quite another to persuade German, Dutch, Austrian 
and other mostly Northern European surplus countries to agree to a more debtor-friendly 
version of adjustment policies.  
 
What the EU needs is not only more financial resources, but also new ideas about how to 
create more inclusive, diverse, and pluralistic European societies and economies. Here I agree 
with Aglietta, who argues: 
 
Integration in the absence of a Europe-wide development strategy succeeded only in 
concentrating industrial activity in the regions where it was already strong, while the 
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periphery lost ground. To counter this slide into long-term stagnation will require a 
development project capable of relaunching innovation across the whole range of 
economic activities, driven by investment largely anchored at regional and local 
level, with a strong environmental component.112  
 
If countless billions were found to prop up large European financial institutions, it is not 
implausible to think a small fraction of that sum could be devoted to such a development project. 
The future of the EU will be determined by the ability of European political forces and civil 
society to articulate and push forward alternative scenarios for such “possible Europes.”113  
 
Unfortunately, the politically weakened European mainstream parties— he traditional 
standard bearers of the post-World War II “embedded liberalism” consensus — are now on the 
defense. Instead of offering novel progressive solutions, the mainstream seems extremely 
vulnerable to the populist challenge coming both from the extreme right and extreme left.   
Instead of surrendering to the populists’ false promises of quick fixes, the mainstream has to 
reinvent itself. It must respond to the social anxieties that are helping fuel nationalist populism.  
Populist leaders are promising better pensions, health care and more jobs, an agenda that is 
winning over the abandoned working class communities that were once a stronghold of the 
European social democratic and other progressive parties.  Leaders of socially oriented, pro-
liberal parties can reverse the nationalist trend by returning the EU to its initial role as th
promoter of European solidarity and equality. Job training and ‘green’ growth are just some of 
the possible public investments in this direction. As the Gr ece’s humiliating defeat by the 
German-led austerity coalition illustrates, this will take a concerted, Europe-wide initiative.114 
If European democrats of various political colours do not start offering a more compelling 
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